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No Simple Dichotomies: Lobbyists and the 
European Parliament 
 
DAVID EARNSHAW AND DAVID JUDGE 
 
 
To call lobbyists of the European Parliament ‘unelected legislators’ is 
somewhat misleading. Similarly, to talk of ‘inspired legislation’, where 
laws, or more particularly amendments to legislation, are ‘written by a 
lobby group from the civil society and more or less rubber stamped by a 
public body’1 is to over-simplify a complex and mediated relationship 
between elected ‘legislators’ and unelected ‘interest representatives’. 
Indeed, in the case of the European Union (EU), identifying a single ‘public 
body’ as a ‘legislator’ is problematic in itself as all three major institutions 
– Commission, Council and European Parliament – perform legislative 
roles. Moreover, securing a single, clearly defined imprint of a ‘rubber 
stamp’ on legislation is difficult given the inter-institutional bargaining that 
results in blurred and smudged legislative imprints at the best of times. 
 
What should be made clear at the outset of any discussion of lobbying in 
the EP, therefore, is that the effects of lobbying are contingent and not certain. 
They fluctuate in accordance with inter-institutional interactions, national 
interests, types of policy, types of legislation, as well as the style of lobbying, 
the coalitions formed around specific policies and the nature of resources 
deployed by lobbyists themselves. If, as Beate Kohler-Koch notes, the EP has 
become ‘a decisive target for lobbyists’ since the enhancement of its powers 
under the co-decision procedure, lobbyists in turn have had to ‘cope with the 
institutional structure, the procedures and the policy style within Parliament’.2 
 
Alongside any empirical assessment of the effects of lobbying is a 
parallel normative dimension of the promotion of sectional interests. 
Historically, most Western parliaments have been able to accommodate the 
representation of ‘functional’ or ‘sectional’ interests pragmatically 
alongside territorial, individualistic, or party notions of representation.3 Yet 
the challenges posed by group representation to established conceptions of 
parliamentary representation have raised fundamental normative questions 
about the impact of ‘interest representation’ upon established liberal 
democratic decision-making processes in the EU and its member states. 
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These broader issues are raised elsewhere in this volume: what we are 
concerned with more specifically is the linkage between the ‘unelected’ 
representatives of organised interests and ‘elected legislators’ in the EP. 
 
In order to highlight these normative and empirical issues the following 
discussion is structured in two sections. First, some broad observations 
about the interactions between lobbyists and MEPs are made; and, second, 
a detailed example, of the processing of the ‘Tobacco’ directive in 
2000–2001, is provided to substantiate some of these general claims. 
 
THE ‘WHO’, THE ‘WHAT’ AND THE ‘HOW’ OF LOBBYING THE EP 
 
Exactly what constitutes ‘interest representation’ is the cause of heated 
academic debate but need not detain us here. All that needs to be noted is 
that the range of interests represented in Brussels is vast. It has been 
estimated that there are some 10,000 lobbyists in Brussels.4 In terms of the 
number of active groups and organised interests, Simon Hix calculated that 
in the mid-1990s there were in excess of 1,600, with three main types: 561 
individual companies with their own public affairs units, 314 ‘Euro groups’, 
and 302 public affairs consultancies and law firms.5 By 1998, however, 
Greenwood identified 700 ‘Euro groups’, 200 firms with their own public 
affairs units, and 25 public affairs consultancies operating in the Belgian 
capital.6 In addition, there were some 135 territorial authorities active in 
Brussels.7 Both estimates are exclusively ‘Brussels-focused’ and do not take 
into account the wide range of national groups throughout the EU which 
also seek to influence EU policies in indirect ways. The most effective 
collectively organised interests and lobbyists know that ‘Brussels is very 
much an insider’s town’.8 They are aware that knowing who to speak to, and 
when, are vital resources in the informal interpersonal and inter-institutional 
networks operating in the Belgian capital. 
 
Certainly there are frequent interactions between MEPs and organised 
interests. Indeed, the indispensability of interest representation is pointed 
out by Kohler-Koch, who notes that because of MEPs’ information 
deficiencies and time constraints ‘they have to be open to lobbying’.9 The 
sheer scale of interaction was revealed in one survey of MEPs in 1996 
which discovered that some 67,000 contacts occurred between MEPs and 
interest groups each year.10 A more recent survey of MEPs, in 2000, 
recorded that over half of MEPs had weekly contact with interest groups; 
and around a third had weekly interactions with lobbyists.11 
 
The Three Ts: Transmission, Translation and Timing 
‘Interest representation’ and ‘lobbying’ in parliaments are normally 
justified in terms of information transmission, translation and timing. The 
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transmission of information from interest organisations to MEPs is deemed 
essential as it provides pre-digested information for elected representatives 
who are often not experts in the particular policy area under consideration. 
This ‘briefing’ function also allows specific groups and organisations to 
translate often complex and technical information into accessible data for 
busy elected representatives. Indeed, as one Italian MEP noted, successful 
lobbyists supply ‘information in … a clear fashion so that the [MEP] 
doesn’t have to be an expert in the field’.12 In these interchanges the 
preferences of MEPs and lobbyists alike are for issue-specific briefings and 
the provision of detailed amendments at appropriate times. Of most use for 
both sides in the MEP–interest relationship is contact on ‘issues of 
particular interest’ and ‘propositions for amendments to the directives under 
discussion’.13 The clear preference in the EP is for direct, personal, well-timed 
and pertinent contact; with lobbyists providing targeted information 
on specific legislative amendments. 
 
As important as transmission and translation of information, however, is 
the timing of its dissemination. The timing of the provision of information 
at the appropriate point in the EU’s legislative cycle is a key resource of 
groups and lobbyists. Thus, Beate Kohler-Koch is in no doubt that: 
‘[t]iming is considered to be most essential for successful performance’ and 
that, in turn, the ‘timing of interest representation is dominated by the 
procedural rules of EU-decision making’.14 Certainly, with the extension of 
the co-decision procedure lobbyists have become increasingly aware of the 
need to ‘act more quickly to get their views across to MEPs’. As Elaine 
Cruickshanks, Chief Executive Officer of the consultancy Hill and 
Knowlton International, notes ‘players from the Council of Ministers and 
the Parliament are brokering deals much earlier under the codecision 
procedure’.15 
 
Within the EP itself there is recognition of the intimate connection 
between substantive policy concerns and the procedural constraints and 
opportunities affecting the timing of influence. In this context, timing is 
particularly acute when amendments to Commission proposals are to be 
tabled in committee. Committees that have heavy legislative loads are 
especially colonised by representatives of organised groups and consultants. 
The sessions of the EP’s Environment or Industry Committees, for example, 
regularly attract several hundred interest representatives. But the provision 
of information is not simply ‘supply-led’ but is also ‘demand-led’. 
Committee rapporteurs, committee chairmen, vice-chairmen and shadow 
rapporteurs are particularly prominent ‘targets’ for the supply of 
information and, in reverse, are significant ‘consumers’ of information from 
outside organisations. Rapporteurs in drafting their reports routinely seek 
information not only from other EU institutions but also from interest 
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associations and lobbyists.16 In addition, committee members often request 
draft amendments from interested organisations when the groups concerned 
have not already suggested their own favoured amendments. As a 
consequence, the process of amendment in committee is often characterised 
by intensive negotiation, dialogue and compromise not only among 
committee members but, crucially, between MEPs and affected interests 
across Europe. 
 
Amendment Overload 
While the provision of detailed legislative amendments by lobbyists may be 
welcomed by busy MEPs in reducing their need to review complicated texts 
and draft amendments personally, one consequence of a preference for 
specific amendments is ‘amendment overload’. It is not unknown for a 
single legislative proposal to attract up to 500 amendments in committee.17 
Indeed, the rise in the number of amendments tabled in Parliament, and the 
increased time-costs associated with voting, has resulted in electronic 
voting becoming more widely used in EP committees. Such time pressures, 
in turn, led to Parliament’s 2002 Rules of Procedure further limiting the 
possibilities to table amendments in plenary.18 
 
Of course, the tabling of amendments does not necessarily ensure their 
adoption when voted on. Nonetheless, the fact remains that interest 
representatives are currently responsible for the initial drafting of a very 
high proportion of the amendments tabled in Parliament’s committees. 
Informed estimates put this in the region of 75 to 80 per cent in the most 
active legislative committees. More generally, few insiders would contest 
the fact that, even in the absence of specifically drafted amendments, the 
inspiration behind individual legislative (and other) amendments often 
flows from outside the EP. 
 
The sheer complexity of processing amendments should not be 
underestimated, with each amendment having to be translated into 11 
languages, distributed to all committee members, and then voted on, or a 
compromise brokered. This process is complicated still further in instances 
(frequent in practice) of overlap between individual amendments, and of 
multiple amendments to individual articles and paragraphs of proposals and 
to draft reports. Moreover, duplication of tabled amendments is a common 
phenomenon, with different MEPs, even from different party groups, 
submitting identical amendments.19 Besides the embarrassment factor in 
such cases, it is thus apparent which MEP has been successfully influenced 
by which interest. As one Commission official responsible for steering a 
legislative proposal through the EP remarked to one of the authors in June 
2002: ‘the latest sport in the Commission is to identify which group or 
company drafted which amendment’. 
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This does, of course, raise the intriguing normative question of whether 
such amending capacity is necessarily ‘sinister’ or ‘anti-democratic’. The 
answer to this question lies beyond the scope of this particular article. 
Nonetheless, MEPs can, and do, defend their tabling of amendments, 
generated outside Parliament, as attesting to their responsiveness to societal 
demands rather than as evidence of their domination by unelected interests. 
They would also contend that each amendment has not simply to be tabled, 
but also presented, justified, argued, frequently compromised, and only then 
voted on in Parliament’s committees or plenary. Amendments are often 
subject to intense controversy, with votes on individual amendments in 
committee frequently being more contested than the final vote in committee 
or plenary. 
 
Inter-institutional and Intra-institutional Intelligence 
MEPs and interest representatives trade not only substantive information on 
policies but also exchange ‘inter-institutional’ information. The reciprocal 
trading of information on the thinking and scheduling of legislation within 
the Commission or Council is a vital commodity in the MEP–lobbyist 
relationship. Of particular currency in this exchange is intra-institutional 
information on the work patterns of, and rate of legislative progress in, the 
various parliamentary committees engaged in processing specific 
directives. Representatives of interest associations and lobbyists often 
provide informal monitoring for MEPs of the asymmetries of committee 
activity on a particular directive. They track the different deadlines imposed 
by the various committees for the tabling of amendments; variations in the 
speed of processing proposals across committees; and possible divergences 
of policy emphases in the different committees dealing with the same issue. 
In this way, interest groups with a mastery of the EP’s procedural 
complexities and a developed surveillance capacity provide not only 
substantive policy briefing but also inter- and intra-institutional intelligence 
for MEPs. 
 
Hearings 
The capacity of the EP to gain (and disseminate) information has been 
enhanced through the procedure of public hearings. Such hearings are 
convened by the EP’s committees with the permission of the Bureau.20 The 
purpose of hearings is to invite experts and interested organisations to 
provide evidence and engage in structured dialogue with committee 
members. Representatives of the Commission and Council attend the 
hearings, and the Commission is frequently invited to respond to the views 
expressed during the course of the hearing. In 2000, 17 hearings were 
convened, and 25 hearings were held in 2001. Indeed, in the first four 
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months of 2002, 15 hearings were held and ranged across topics such as 
tobacco advertising and sponsorship, the future of European tourism, and 
sport and audiovisual rights. 
 
The main advantages of public hearings are that they help committee 
members to familiarise themselves with a particular policy (either in terms of 
detail or the broader context). One dimension is that they provide a procedure 
whereby MEPs can engage in ‘exploratory dialogue’ and ‘forward thinking’ 
and so raise issues for consideration by the other EU institutions. Another 
dimension of hearings is that they provide MEPs with supplementary sources 
of advice and information from independent experts, organised interests and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with which to assess the outcomes 
of the Commission’s own pre-legislative consultations. Thus, for example, 
the hearing on tobacco advertising and sponsorship in April 2002 included 
speakers from public health interest groups (the Standing Committee of 
European Doctors, the European Cancer Leagues and the European Heart 
Network), from the tobacco industry (Imperial Tobacco, the Italian 
Association of Tobacco Producers and GITES), as well as from academic 
experts and the recipients of tobacco sponsorship. 
 
Intergroups 
‘Intergroups’ are unofficial groupings of MEPs who share a common 
interest in a particular cause or interest. With the exception of the intergroup 
of Elected Local and Regional Representatives no other intergroup has 
formal status within the EP. Despite the ‘unofficial’ nature of these groups 
some 100 were in existence in 2000.21 There is such diversity among 
intergroups in terms of size, membership, frequency of meetings, links with 
political groups and outside interests that it is difficult to make generalised 
statements about their activities. 
 
Nonetheless, Corbett et al. list the benefits of intergroups for the EP as 
enabling MEPs to focus on a ‘particular set of issues of specific national, 
constituency or personal concern’, to specialise, to make contacts with 
outside interest groups on an informal basis, and to facilitate political 
contacts outside their own political groups.22 There are, however, also 
certain disadvantages associated with intergroup activity. Indeed, concern 
with the operations of a few intergroups and their close connections with 
outside lobbies led the Conference of Presidents in 1995 to ratify an 
agreement to reaffirm and underline the unofficial status of such groups. 
Intergroups were expected to make clear that they were not organs of the EP, 
they did not speak on behalf of Parliament, and they could not use the EP’s 
logo or its official title in any communications or printed materials. Specific 
rules were also drafted in the same year to bring intergroups into line with 
the rules concerning lobbyists and the declaration of financial interest of 
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MEPs and their assistants. In 1999 further restrictions were placed on the 
creation of intergroups when they were required to have the support of party 
group leaders before they could be constituted. 
 
In addition to the concerns that some groups merely served as a ‘front’ 
for certain organised interests, there was also concern that the sheer scale 
and activism of intergroup networks constituted ‘a rival centre of attention 
to official parliamentary activities, and in certain circumstances may 
undercut the latter’.23 Thus, on occasion, the clash of timing of intergroup 
meetings with official parliamentary committee meetings and plenary 
debates has adversely affected attendance at the latter. Similarly, outside 
speakers occasionally quibble at attending committee meetings after 
appearing at intergroup sessions. 
 
The ‘Institutional Lobbyists’ 
In addition to ‘mainstream’ lobbying by interest representatives, the 1990s 
also witnessed a dramatic increase in the lobbying of the EP by the 
Commission and national governments (including third country 
governments). In recognition of the EP’s enhanced legislative capabilities in 
that decade, the Commission and national governments acknowledged the 
necessity of maintaining a dialogue with appropriate MEPs. 
 
The characterisation of national and Commission officials as ‘lobbyists’ 
in the context of EU decision-making is certainly not new. In 1993, for 
example, David Spence identified the national official as ‘clearly a lobbyist 
of European institutions and other Member States’ officials’.24 Within the 
EP, Ken Collins, then chair of the Environment Committee, in his address 
to the hearing organised by the Rules Committee into lobbying in 1992, 
noted the difficulties in defining lobbyists. He argued that, as far as the EP 
was concerned, a definition should include not only ‘delegations of the 
Council’ but also ‘Commission officials defending their proposals vis-à-vis 
Members and parliamentary committees … representatives of local and 
regional authorities and representatives of third countries’.25 Thus, while the 
depiction of national officials as lobbyists is not new, the greater attention 
paid by them to the EP is relatively new. Whereas over a decade ago Spence 
devoted just one short paragraph to the role of the UK permanent 
representation in Brussels in following EP affairs, such a cursory treatment 
would be unlikely in the 2000s. 
 
EU governments willingly provide policy briefings to their own national 
delegations in the EP. One EP committee chairman, in interview in the 
1994–99 Parliament, observed that: ‘My permanent representation – the 
Dutch – is giving us a lot of good briefing, written briefings, so I have good 
information about what’s on the agenda; about what is the opinion of my 
own country’.26 Traditionally, and as confirmed by this MEP, much national 
 
68 
 
briefing was essentially formal, taking the form of written memoranda 
outlining the view of national administrations on Commission proposals, or 
on parliamentary reports once tabled for the EP’s plenary.27 What has 
changed in recent years, however, is that national officials and politicians 
have started to seek to influence EP proceedings more intensively, at an 
earlier stage, and in tandem with their evolving position in the Council of 
Ministers. There is also a recognition that national governments should 
provide tailored briefings for committee rapporteurs, other key committee 
actors, constituency MEPs, committee members and, ultimately, all MEPs 
in the run-up to plenary, together even with a voting list ‘so that those who 
agree with your position overall know how to vote for it in detail’.28 
 
Moreover, it is not unusual for individual permanent representation 
officials to suggest legislative amendments to their respective national 
MEPs in committee. Invariably these amendments parallel current national 
negotiating positions in the relevant working group of the Council. In this 
sense, national officials have started to intertwine themselves firmly into the 
pattern of interest representation within the EP. In addition, officials of the 
permanent representations sometimes also operate collectively in seeking to 
influence the EP, particularly as a result of co-decision. To this end, 
permanent representation attachés, who are responsible for relations with 
the EP, meet before each plenary session to co-ordinate their positions and 
identify targets for direct lobbying. Obviously, at this stage, national 
officials will reflect primarily the position arrived at in Council. Such 
lobbying may be intensive. In the run-up to the EP’s vote on the Members’ 
Statute in May 1999 (a vote which ultimately went against the view of 
Council), one of the permanent representation parliamentary attachés 
commented to one of the authors that he had ‘done nothing for a month but 
lobby the Parliament on the members’ statute’. 
 
One recent, and dramatic, example of the significance of ‘institutional 
lobbying’ of the EP was provided by the ‘Takeover Bids’ directive. This 
directive (formally titled: 13th directive on Company Law, Concerning 
Takeover Bids) was rejected by the EP’s plenary after agreement in the 
conciliation committee. It was the first rejection of a joint text under the codecision2 
procedure. It was also the first rejection after a tied plenary vote 
of 273 in favour 273 against and 22 abstentions. Indeed, the high level of 
participation in the vote – with 568 MEPs voting – was itself unique. 
However, neither the details of the proposal, nor indeed of its passage 
through the EP,29 are the focus of attention here. Instead, what is of 
importance is that the directive constituted the first co-decision procedure 
during which a member state dissented openly and assertively and 
decisively from a previously agreed Council common position – and sought 
explicitly a parliamentary rejection. 
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 After reaching agreement in Council in June 2000, the German 
government subsequently withdrew its support in early 2001. The change of 
position came after intense lobbying of Chancellor Schröder by senior 
executives of German companies, especially VW and BASF, along with the 
head of the Mining, Chemical and Energy Workers’ Union.30 Once the 
German government had dissociated itself from the common position then 
the process of conciliation became extremely complicated. At third reading, 
after intense lobbying of German MEPs – by the German government, 
leading German companies and trade unions – they voted overwhelmingly 
as a single national bloc irrespective of EP party group. As the Financial 
Times noted: ‘In a rare display of unity, the German government and 
opposition, along with leading business associations and trade unions all 
welcomed the vote.’31 Conversely, Frits Bolkestein, the Commissioner with 
responsibility for the ‘Takeover’ directive, had no doubts that the blame for 
failure rested ‘squarely on Germany’.32 
 
In this case, a national government, in conjunction with national interest 
organisations and national MEPs, was instrumental in securing the rejection 
of EU legislation. What is particularly significant for the present discussion 
is how the simple dichotomisation of roles between ‘elected’ and 
‘unelected’ legislators becomes more convoluted in the case of the 
‘Takeover’ directive. Indeed, the actions of ‘directly elected EU-level and 
EU-wide legislators’ (MEPs) can be counterposed by the actions of 
‘directly elected national representatives’ (the German Council delegation) 
who, in turn, constitute ‘indirectly elected EU legislators’. More 
significantly, and more contentiously, such national ‘institutional lobbyists’ 
may be designated as ‘unelected EU-level and EU-wide legislators’ in the 
immediate and literal sense that they do not have an EU-wide electoral 
mandate. But this is to get ahead of the argument. Let us first of all examine 
the respective contributions of ‘elected’ and ‘unelected’ legislators to the 
processing of the ‘Tobacco’ directive. 
 
AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 
 
Much has been written on lobbying within the EP, but there remains relatively 
little detailed research on the phenomenon.33 One fairly common assumption 
is that the ‘EP attracts a disproportionate amount of lobbying from certain 
groups (environmentalists, women, consumers, animal rights)’.34 Yet 
offsetting this assumption is a growing recognition of the extensive 
involvement of business and corporate interests in the legislative activities of 
the EP.35 Perhaps it is safest to conclude, therefore, that ‘few interests dare risk 
leaving the parliamentary arena to their opponents, and hence [the EP] … 
attracts the full melange of stakeholders’.36 To illustrate this point, the 
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following study of the passage of the Tobacco labelling directive in 
2000–2001 reveals both the intensity of lobbying and the differential and 
mediated effect of lobbying. Determining exactly which interests were 
winners and which were losers presupposes that bargaining in the EP is a 
zero-sum game. In practice, however, it may be a positive-sum game. 
 
The ‘Tobacco’ Directive 
The ‘Tobacco’ directive (formally entitled the Directive on the 
Approximation of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of 
Member States concerning the Manufacture, Presentation and Sale of 
Tobacco Products)37 was submitted by the Commission to Parliament in 
January 2000. The lobbying of the tobacco industry and health activists was 
an important part of the processing of the proposal, as was informal interinstitutional 
contact, and the ‘anticipatory’ behaviour of MEPs.38 
 
The complexity, as well as the political significance, of the issue was 
revealed in the nuanced process of lobbying by different organised interests 
and associations. Indeed, it is worth making a few broad observations about 
the development of the ‘health lobby’ before examining the details of the 
tobacco labelling case study. At one end of the lobbying spectrum are the 
‘health activist’ groups. These include organisations such as the European 
Public Health Alliance, the Association of European Cancer Leagues and 
Medecins sans Frontiers. Most recently, patient organisations have started to 
have an impact in Brussels (such as European Patients Voice) as well as 
bodies representing patients with specific diseases (such as Alzheimer 
Europe, or Gamian, a group focused on mental illness). Certainly there has 
been a dramatic growth of such health activist groups over the last decade. 
 
Ranged alongside ‘health activist’ groups are the representatives of 
specific healthcare sectors: such as healthcare insurance bodies – the 
Association Internationale des Mutualité (AIM); pharmacists (the 
Pharmaceutical Group of the European Union; pharmaceutical wholesalers, 
the Groupement International de la Répartition Pharmaceutique Européenne 
(GIRP); doctors (the Standing Committee of European Doctors, and 
national organisations such as the BMA, which has had a permanent 
Brussels representation since the late 1990s); and healthcare managers (the 
European Health Management Association). Again, the healthcare sector 
has a much more visible and active representative presence in the EP than a 
decade ago. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum are industry representatives. A particular 
feature of the lobbying process on the tobacco directive was the entry of the 
pharmaceutical industry into the debate, and its adoption of a moderately 
progressive stance in support of the case of health activists. (In part, this was 
not simply altruism, as some benefit would also accrue from the promotion 
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of their own smoking prevention products.) Numerically, the EU ‘health’ 
lobby remains dominated by the pharmaceutical industry. Certainly, the 
industry has taken care to interpose itself into parliamentary networks. Thus, 
for example, the pharmaceutical industry’s trade association, the European 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) has 
employed a dedicated parliamentary affairs manager since the early 1990s. 
Moreover, since the mid-1990s, individual pharmaceutical companies 
represented in Brussels (as most are) stand out among the corporate sector in 
recruiting EP specialists to staff their Brussels government affairs 
representative offices. Today, the industry’s representatives and its 
consultants form their own veritable mini-colony at the rear of Parliament’s 
Environment Committee during discussions of pharmaceutical licensing and 
other legislative proposals relating to the sector. 
 
Counterposed against these ‘health lobbyists’ were the representatives 
of the tobacco companies. But it should be acknowledged from the outset 
that there was no single, cohesive and overriding industry perspective on the 
tobacco directive. In fact, some of the very largest tobacco companies (such 
as Philip Morris) adopted a more positive position to the directive than did 
the smaller companies. At one level, the largest companies identified certain 
features of the EU’s tobacco legislation – relating to packaging, labelling 
and advertising – as a potential means by which to maintain their current 
market shares indefinitely. Moreover, Swedish manufacturers of Snus 
(Scandinavian oral tobacco) sought to use the proposal to lobby against the 
impending ban on their product. In Sweden, the banning of Snus featured 
regularly as part of the ongoing discussions about the country’s membership 
of the EU. 
 
Given the sheer range of organisations with an ‘interest’ in the tobacco 
labelling directive, it is perhaps not surprising that the EP’s rapporteur 
sought to structure lobbying through the convening of collective meetings 
of the different groups involved. This highlighted not only the range of 
interests, noted in the preceding paragraphs, but also the differences within 
and between different groups involved in the tobacco issue. The differences 
in the lobbying styles and organisational structures adopted by these groups 
was greater than their similarities. 
 
The EP’s Processing of the Proposal 
The prime objective of the Commission’s proposed directive was to 
combine and revise three existing directives on the tar content of cigarettes, 
oral tobacco and labelling of tobacco products. Indeed, the fingerprints of 
the Association of European Cancer Leagues are clearly discernible on the 
Commission’s draft proposal. The main provisions of the directive included 
a reduction in the tar content of cigarettes; harmonisation of ceilings for 
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levels of nicotine and carbon monoxide; more stringent requirements 
concerning the size and type of health warnings on tobacco packets; an 
obligation on manufacturers and importers to list additives, to explain the 
reason for such ingredients and to provide toxicological data on additives; a 
ban on misleading descriptors such as ‘light’ and ‘low tar’; and new review 
and reporting procedures on the implementation of the directive. Despite the 
apparently technical nature of these issues, it is important to place the 
proposal in the political context of increasing concern in Europe over 
smoking and health. 
 
The Commission’s proposal was referred to the Committee on the 
Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy as the committee 
responsible, and opinions were sought from the Legal Affairs, Industry and 
Agriculture Committees. Jules Maaten was appointed rapporteur on 26 
January 2000 and the EP adopted his report in its first reading vote on 14 
June 2000. Some 44 amendments were adopted at first reading. 
 
In essence, Maaten and the Environment Committee maintained the 
EP’s long-standing support for the Commission’s preference for the strict 
regulation of tobacco products in Europe. Although most of the first reading 
amendments might readily be classified as ‘technical’ in nature, in fact 
many went to the heart of how tobacco products should be regulated in 
Europe, how tobacco is perceived, and followed an approach considerably 
at odds with that favoured by most of the tobacco industry. Significantly, in 
this case there was also an important political motivation underlying the 
Environment Committee’s pursuit of what might be perceived by 
‘outsiders’ as a search for technical perfection rather than political impact. 
This was simply that the tobacco industry had become an enthusiastic 
litigant against EU tobacco legislation. (Indeed, the directive resulting from 
Maaten’s report was subject ultimately to three legal challenges.) MEPs 
were conscious, therefore, that amendments designed to maximise the 
health objectives of tobacco legislation would precipitate a legal challenge 
from the tobacco companies on the grounds that the limits imposed by the 
internal market legal base (Article 95) had been exceeded. This 
‘anticipation of future action against legislation’ was evident in the 
arguments advanced by the rapporteur and other Environment Committee 
members. The ‘anticipatory’ logic was also apparent in Parliament more 
widely, as well as within the Commission and Council. Institutionally, if 
health objectives were explicitly advanced, decision-making in Council 
would have to have been by unanimity rather than QMV – to the detriment 
of the stringency of the measure likely to result. In turn, unanimity in 
Council would have led to dilution of the proposal by the most reluctant 
member states (Germany and Greece). As it was, Germany not only voted 
against the common position in Council but also launched a case in the 
Court of Justice against Council and Parliament’s adoption of the measure. 
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The Commission accepted the majority of the EP’s first reading 
amendments ‘in whole or in part’, in some cases subject to drafting 
modifications, and included them in its amended proposal. This was hardly 
surprising as the rapporteur had informally discussed his proposed 
amendments at length with relevant Commission officials. Indeed, from the 
start of the EP’s processing of the proposal, the rapporteur also maintained 
close contacts with successive Council Presidency officials responsible for 
the dossier in the Council’s working group. In fact, the Parliament’s 
rapporteur undoubtedly acquired both a detailed knowledge and a strategic 
vision at least equal to that of member state officials in the Council’s 
working group. If anything, the EP’s rapporteur was placed in a possibly 
advantageous position in relation to his Council interlocutors, because, 
unlike the Council Presidency which changed every six months, the 
rapporteur was able to develop a longer-term perspective on the issue. 
(Indeed, there were four Council Presidencies during the processing of this 
proposal, and the rapporteur had to liaise successively with each.) 
 
Of the amendments taken up by the Commission, only 15 were accepted 
wholly or in part by the Council. However, two of the EP’s amendments that 
had not been accepted by the Commission were adopted. These related to 
the use of terms such as ‘low tar’, ‘light’ or ‘mild’ as product descriptions 
suggesting that a tobacco product was less harmful than others. In its 
consideration of the common position, the Environment Committee 
proposed the re-adoption of many of its first reading amendments. Included 
among the reintroduced amendments was one to require the reporting of test 
results after a deliberate change to a tobacco blend, rather than through an 
annual reporting system. On the issue of warnings, the EP favoured 
labelling which conveyed a ‘serious message rather than simplistic 
slogans’39 but was willing to compromise to take account of the reduced size 
of warnings. Parliament’s desire to have larger warnings arose from an 
acceptance of research findings that the most direct medium for the 
communication of the dangers of smoking was the cigarette packet itself.40 
Moreover, the EP inserted a new paragraph enabling member states to 
require colour photographs or other illustrations of the health consequences 
of smoking to be displayed as part of the warning. This was modelled on the 
Canadian style of regulation. On this point the Environment Committee 
succeeded in stretching – or at least interpreting creatively – Parliament’s 
own Rules of Procedure sufficiently to introduce amendments to the 
common position that had not been adopted at first reading. This was 
attributable, at least indirectly, to lobbying conducted by representatives of 
Health Canada who, in meetings with MEPs in Brussels, pointed 
specifically to the effect of earlier Canadian legislation which, notably, 
required the labels of cigarette packets to carry strong graphic images 
intended to deter smoking. 
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To maximise the effects of these general and additional warnings, the 
first reading amendment was reintroduced to require such warnings to be 
displayed on tobacco vending machines as well. Parliament also 
reintroduced its amendment on the harmonisation of testing. Similarly, the 
amendment requiring the Commission to submit a proposal (by December 
2004) for a directive providing for a common list of authorised ingredients 
(and their addictiveness) for tobacco products was reintroduced. 
 
Throughout the process proponents of strict regulation worked closely 
with MEPs. As Warleigh observes, relations between lobbyists and policymakers 
‘can be so strong that NGOs are seen by some institutional actors 
not as lobbyists but as colleagues able to supply information otherwise 
unavailable through their participation in formal consultation with actors 
from other institutions’.41 This was certainly the case for the proponents of 
the strict regulation of tobacco products as they fed MEPs information 
relating to practices in third countries in support of their arguments, and, 
more specifically, drafted amendments and provided substantiating 
arguments for supportive MEPs. 
 
In considering the EP’s amendments, the Commission took into account 
the Court of Justice’s ruling, of 5 October 2000,42 annulling the directive on 
tobacco advertising.43 The annulment of the tobacco advertising directive, 
effectively on the grounds that it exceeded the possibilities available under 
Article 95 for the EU to act against tobacco advertising, was a constant 
backdrop during the adoption of the tobacco labelling proposal, and became 
particularly important during the proposal’s second reading. 
 
At second reading a total of 32 amendments were adopted by 
Parliament. Of these the Commission accepted 22 and modified its proposal 
accordingly. Council announced that it was unable to approve all the 
amendments and, accordingly, conciliation followed. After six and a half 
hours of intense negotiations an agreement was reached at the concluding 
meeting held on 27 February 2001. Agreement was facilitated by the 
intensive inter-institutional interactions that had occurred at earlier stages of 
the process,44 and by the prior meetings of the EP’s delegation and the 
trialogue held with the Swedish presidency and the Commission on 6 
February 2001.45 Indeed, in the trialogue the Council accepted 12 
amendments and presented compromise texts for some others. 
 
The main issues for consideration in conciliation, therefore, included the 
nature of health warnings, prohibition of misleading descriptors, the use of 
photographs and illustrations, the list of ingredients, and a transitional 
period for exported tobacco products. Compromises were reached on all of 
these issues. At this stage, the proponents of tight controls on tobacco made 
available to the Conciliation Committee (and to all 626 MEPs) Canadian 
cigarette packets (which were empty!) to demonstrate that strict regulation 
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of the labelling of tobacco products was entirely practical and, indeed, was 
already in force elsewhere. This provided a clear example of issue-specific 
coalition formation, where the key to influence was marginal advantage and 
certainly not shared values among groups.46 Thus, for example, the financial 
cost of shipping and distributing the cigarette packs to all MEPs was met by 
a major pharmaceutical company; yet the accompanying letters were 
drafted and signed by health activists (transparently declaring 
pharmaceutical company support). Certainly on many other issues such 
activists have shown their hostility to the promotion of the interests of 
pharmaceutical companies. 
 
The outcome of the conciliation process was judged by the EP’s 
rapporteur to be that ‘the agreement reached is an excellent one which goes 
well beyond what was possible before its second reading’.47 On health 
warnings the message was strengthened and the size of health warnings was 
agreed on the basis of a Commission compromise. The possibility of 
member states authorising the use of photographs and other graphic 
material on cigarette packets was conceded and the Commission (much 
against its own will) was given the task of adopting appropriate rules by 
December 2002. Agreement was also reached that the descriptors ‘mild’, 
‘light’ or ‘low tar’ were to be prohibited. (One result of this provision was 
that Japanese Tobacco, manufacturers of ‘Mild Seven’ cigarettes – whose 
brand and trademark were effectively outlawed in Europe – launched a 
Court of Justice case against the EP and Council.) 
 
Tobacco companies were to be obliged to submit to authorities in the 
member states an annual list of the ingredients found in their products, and 
the Commission was to initiate a proposal, by the end of 2004, for a list of 
all ingredients authorised for tobacco products. Compromise was reached 
on the issue of a transitional period (until 2007) for exported tobacco 
products to meet the tar and nicotine ceilings as products marketed in the 
EU. The tobacco industry (especially from the UK) had mounted a highprofile, 
and in the end quite effective, lobby on the transitional period. 
Lobbying focused overwhelmingly on the potential threat to employment as 
a result of the adoption of this provision. In particular, a targeted campaign, 
ostensibly led by workers and their trade unions in the tobacco industry, was 
directed at MEPs with cigarette factories in their constituencies. Coalition 
formation, in this case between employers and employees, and their trade 
unions, was again based on short-lived common interests, and was again 
successful. In addition, the position of MEPs was moderated by a 
recognition that legislation banning the export of high-tar cigarettes from 
the EU might contravene World Trade Organisation rules. 
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CONCLUSION: NO SIMPLE DICHOTOMIES 
 
The reciprocal transmission of information from organised interests to 
MEPs, and the subsequent enhancement of the informational resources 
within the EP, has many benefits. Nonetheless, there remains a deep-seated 
concern that ‘reconciling the demands of self-interested private interests 
with the wider interests of civil society [is] a central problem of democratic 
life’.48 Historically, interest representation has been regarded as a particular 
‘problem’ for parliaments. Elected assemblies have institutionalised the 
norms of the equal status and voting weight of individual representatives, 
and the transparency of deliberation. In practice, however, the interactions 
between organised interests and elected representatives often reflect 
inequalities of access to, and provision of, information; and translucent 
rather than transparent bargaining. In these circumstances, fears about the 
representation of ‘sinister interests’, to use John Stuart Mill’s phrase,49 are 
articulated and demands for regulation emerge. 
 
Just such fears and demands emerged after the introduction of direct EU 
elections to the EP in 1979 and have increased with each successive 
increment in the EP’s legislative powers. In an environment in which MEPs 
‘retain close links with particular sectors or interest groups which will help 
to condition their choice of priorities’,50 what concerns MEPs and outsiders 
alike is just how close these links are, and what kind of resources and 
incentives are used to ‘condition the choice of priorities’. These concerns 
over the unregulated activities of lobbyists led to a seven-year campaign for 
the regulation of lobbying and lobbyists in the face of accusations that the 
voting independence of a small number of MEPs had been impaired by their 
pecuniary involvement with outside interests.51 
 
The culmination of this campaign, and of exceedingly protracted 
deliberations, was the amendment of the EP’s Rules of Procedure in 1996 – 
and the insertion of a new annex in 1997 (Annex IX) – on lobbying in 
Parliament (Rule 9).52 The main purpose of the 1996 rule changes was to 
make the activities of interest representatives more transparent by 
establishing a public register of lobbyists. Henceforth, lobbyists were 
required to respect a code of conduct and sign a register that was to be made 
available to the public on request. In return, lobbyists were to be granted a 
photo ID access pass to Parliament’s buildings, obviating the need to be 
‘signed in’ to the building or to be accompanied therein. Also in 1996 rules 
were adopted to monitor the ‘interests’ of MEPs themselves.53 
Clearly, through these rules the EP and its members recognise the 
potential dangers of the ‘unelected’ representatives of sectional interests 
promoting those interests over and above an EU ‘general interest’ articulated 
by elected legislators. In practice, however, the simple dichotomy between 
‘elected’ and ‘unelected’ legislators is blurred by the indirectly elected status 
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 of the Council and its national delegations and the ‘unelected’ status of the 
Commission itself. Yet, in the context of the EP’s legislative process, these 
institutions constitute external ‘institutional lobbyists’. 
 
If the simple divide between ‘elected’ and ‘unelected’ legislators is more 
problematic than at first appears, so the notion of ‘legislator’, as expressed in 
the introduction of this volume, also proves to be contentious. It is one thing 
to argue that lobbyists and interest representatives contribute to the 
legislative process and that ‘public legislation comes in many different forms 
and from many different sources’. It is another, however, to argue that the 
legislative impact of lobbyists is necessarily unmediated, direct or even unidirectional. 
This is not to deny that lobbyists can and do write specific 
legislative amendments, or that MEPs actively seek such amendments (or 
non-legislative interventions from lobbyists – such as questions). Instead, it 
is to note that precisely because legislative interventions derive from ‘many 
different sources’ the notion that elected representatives merely rubber stamp 
the interjections of lobbyists should be questioned. As the example of the 
tobacco directive illustrates, there are often competing and occasionally 
overlapping coalitions of ‘unelected’ interests aligned with different 
constellations of elected representatives. Moreover, there is no unambiguous 
normative correlation between ‘elected-equals-good’ and ‘unelected-equalsbad’. 
In the case of the ‘tobacco’ directive, some business interests (a 
pharmaceutical company) co-operated with health groups (good?) while 
others (some workers’ organisations) co-operated with Tobacco companies 
(bad?). In turn, some MEPs, in representing the interests of their electors and 
their sustained employment in the tobacco industry (good?), did so by 
supporting the case of tobacco companies (bad?). None of these statements 
should be taken as normatively categorical assessments. Instead, they simply 
point to the complexity of the processing of legislation within the EP and to 
the multi-dimensionality of EU decision-making. In these nested dimensions 
the normative certainties of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ – commonly associated with 
the adjectives ‘elected’ and ‘unelected’ – have to be re-examined, as, indeed, 
does the very concept of ‘legislator’ itself. 
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